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DO RULES BREED RULES? VERTICAL RULE-MAKING





UNIVERSITY OF ANTWERP AND TILBURG UNIVERSITY
ABSTRACT: Understanding where (ineffective) organizational rules come from is of
vital importance for both public administration scholars and practitioners. Yet little is
known about the underlying mechanisms that explain why external rules may cause
organizational rule breeding and, as a by-product, red tape. Using a combination of
archival and interview data, the authors empirically study rule-breeding processes in
the case of Gasunie, which is a heavily regulated Dutch gas transport organization.
The archival findings indicate that rule stocks have increased substantially over time
at every policy level. Furthermore, the interview data support the notion that policy-
makers at different levels are jointly responsible for excessive rule breeding and,
ultimately, organizational red tape.
INTRODUCTION
A growing literature on red tape is concerned with understanding ineffective rules
(Bozeman and Feeney 2011), but empirical studies mostly ignore the rule sources
from which red tape is said to derive (Kaufmann and Feeney 2012; 2014). Indeed,
existing theory on formalization as a red tape driver can be condensed into the general
assumptions that (1) more rules means more red tape; and (2) government rules and
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regulations are the main source of organizational rules (Brewer et al. 2012; Bozeman
2000; Bozeman and Feeney 2011; Kaufmann and van Witteloostuijn 2012; Bozeman
and DeHart-Davis 1999). Despite their intuitive appeal, these assumptions have
received little empirical attention (Kaufmann and Feeney 2012; Bozeman 2012).
In this article, we aim to improve our understanding of formalization dynamics by
analyzing rule stock changes at the supranational, national, and organizational level.
Drawing on the rule ecology literature (van Witteloostuijn 2003; van Witteloostuijn
and de Jong 2010; Kaufmann and van Witteloostuijn 2012), we argue that popula-
tions of rules are interrelated at different rule-making levels in a hierarchical way.
That is, rule making at one level may spur rule production at lower rule-making
levels. These rule-breeding processes may be functional in nature, but they may also
entail unintended negative consequences (in the current context, red tape). In
the organizational ecology literature, this process is referred to as cascade effects
(Hannan et al. 2003a; 2003b). Here, we argue that similar vertical cascade effects
apply to populations of rules.
Rule-making cascade effects derive from two related processes. First, the
implementation of rules itself may require additional rule making. A clear example
of such vertical implementation dynamics is the transposition of European directives
into national law (Mu¨ller et al. 2010). Here, European rules have to be translated
into national rules, which is likely to result in an increase of national rule stocks
(Kaufmann and van Witteloostuijn 2012). Next, the organizational addressees of
these new national rules may have to make changes to their internal rule stocks to
comply with the new set of national rules. This dynamic, which is directly related
to vertical rule breeding, implies a cascade effect of increasing rule stock sizes that
may result in organizational red tape.
Second, each time a rule maker has to implement rules originating from another
rule maker, there is a risk of unnecessary embellishments. This process of rule breed-
ing is perhaps again best exemplified in the context of the European Union (EU)
through the concept of ‘‘gold plating.’’ Gold plating is said to occur when member
states add or change rules in ways that are not necessary for the implementation of
European directives, thus resulting in additional requirements and costs (McDonald
2000; Lofstedt 2007). As a result of gold plating, national rule stocks, and associated
rule requirements, may increase well beyond the level required for functional policy
implementation and create organizational red tape.
We empirically explore our ecological approach in the context of European and
Dutch legislation related to gas transmission networks, which is part of the EU’s
internal energy policy (Eikeland 2011). Historically, incumbents in the European
gas market have been regional or national monopolists (Eberlein 2008). National
energy suppliers owned the assets for both producing and transporting natural gas,
and were thus able to discriminate ‘‘in matters of who should get access to European
energy networks and on what terms’’ (Eikeland 2011, 244). These serious impedi-
ments to fair competition and trade have resulted in substantial policy reforms that
required national energy suppliers to separate their transmission and production
activities (Eberlein 2008). As a result, both national and organizational rule stocks
have changed drastically.
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In line with Kaufmann and van Witteloostuijn (2012), we first determine the size
of the European and Dutch rule stocks in the gas transport policy domain over time.
We then count the number of organizational rules for the period 2000–2010 at our
case study organization Gasunie, a Dutch organization responsible for the transport
of natural gas. These organizational rule counts are compared to growth patterns of
the relevant European and national rule stocks. Next, we present the main findings
from a set of interviews with Gasunie employees to link our objective rule count data
to perceptions of rule breeding, cascade effects, and red tape.
The contribution of this study is threefold. First, we connect the related litera-
tures on formalization, red tape, organizational ecology, organizational rule ecol-
ogy, and the ecology of law. Second, we provide a detailed quantitative
overview of rule stocks at three levels of analysis, namely supranational, national,
and organizational. Third, we combine objective rule count data with perceptual
measures, thus allowing for a more comprehensive analysis of rule dynamics and
red tape.
The structure of this article is as follows. We start by providing a brief discussion
of existing research on formalization from the organization sciences and red tape lit-
eratures, followed by our rule ecology approach. We then discuss our results, start-
ing with an analysis of the count data, followed by the main findings from our
interview sessions. In this section, the study’s research design related to the organiza-
tional data is described, which includes our rule-counting methods, as well as the
interview protocol. The article concludes with a discussion section, emphasizing
the avenues for future research that follow from the results and limitations of our
study.
In advance, we would like to emphasize that our study is exploratory. To the best of
our knowledge, our study is the first of its kind, introducing a new perspective on the
dynamics within and among rule stocks at different levels of analysis, from supra-
national all the way to organizational. This is why we decided to focus on a case that
is likely to reveal the kind of processes we are interested in: change cascades, across
and within rule stocks. Our case is European and national (here, Dutch) gas
law, and how this affects rule dynamics within a gas-related case organization (here,
Gasunie). Of course, this implies that we may sacrifice external generalizability in our
attempt to maximize internal validity. However, we believe that this is warranted,
given the exploratory nature of our novel take on rule dynamics, formalization,
and red tape. We return to this issue in the discussion.
FORMALIZATION AND RULE-BREEDING DYNAMICS
Formalization in Organization Theory and Red Tape Studies
Only a small number of studies have looked explicitly at supranational, national,
and organizational rule stocks (e.g., Schulz 1998; van Witteloostuijn and de Jong
2010), but the related concept of formalization has been studied extensively in the
organization theory literature. Formalization can be defined as ‘‘the extent to which
rules, procedures, instructions and communications are written’’ (Pugh et al. 1968,
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75). Early studies have linked formalization to structural organizational elements such
as size, complexity, and centralization (e.g., Hall et al. 1967; Hage and Aiken 1967).
Later research has found a wide variety of associations between formalization and
organizational outcomes (DeHart-Davis 2009). For example, formalization may
reduce work alienation (Organ andGreene 1981; Podsakoff et al. 1986), increase orga-
nizational commitment (Michaels et al. 1988), diminish problems of understanding
among partners in interorganizational arrangements (Vlaar et al. 2006), and inhibit
organizational effectiveness as the organization matures (Walsh and Dewar 1987).
Finally, Bozeman and DeHart-Davis (1999) use a case study approach to show
how a specific piece of regulation in the US, namely Title V of the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments, may cause organizational red tape through an overabundance
of functional rule objectives, inaccurate rule forecasts, and rapid changes in the
regulation’s political context.
In the context of the current study, we are particularly interested in formalization
drivers. Pugh et al. (1969) argue that the organizational context affects organization
structure, including formalization. These contextual variables include the organiza-
tion’s origin and history, ownership and control, size, and technology. Kalleberg
et al. (1996, 82) focus on institutional sources that capture ‘‘the presence of powerful
actors having the capacity to mandate, or at least to advocate strongly, the adoption
of structural forms,’’ most notably formalization. In support of their argument, the
authors find that private organizations are less formalized than public and non-profit
ones. Hence, the extant literature provides tentative evidence of organizational rule
making in response to external actors.
Distinguishing formalization from red tape has been one of the key challenges
facing red tape scholars (Bozeman and Feeney 2011). In early empirical work, forma-
lization and red tape are often confounded (Pandey and Scott 2002). As a result,
Bozeman (1993) argued that red tape needs to be carefully disentangled from forma-
lization. Bozeman and Scott (1996) explicitly address the distinction between the
two concepts. In their view, formalization is a neutral term that captures how many
written rules are in existence, whereas red tape is inherently associated with ‘‘bad,’’ or
ineffective, rules. This conceptualization of formalization as physiology and red
tape as pathology has become the dominant theoretical perspective in the red tape
literature.
Formalization and red tape are distinct concepts, but the two are related. Bozeman
(2000, 131) argues that ‘‘if we think of rules—especially controlling rules—as having
an ‘underlying probability’ of turning into red tape, then more rules will likely mean
more red tape.’’ Yet, from an empirical point of view, the relationship between
formalization and red tape has remained understudied. Welch and Pandey (2007)
study how the implementation of intranet technologies in public organizations may
reduce excessive bureaucracy and find that formalization is positively related to red
tape. However, since both concepts are measured using self-reported survey data,
we do not know if this correlation also extends to objective formalization indicators
(Kaufmann and Feeney 2012). Furthermore, the red tape literature mostly ignores the
topic of organizational rule stock drivers. This is where our rule ecology approach
comes in.
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Organizational Rule Ecology and the Ecology of Law
Organizational ecology research dates back to the late 1970s (Hannan and Freeman
1977), but the first comprehensive study on rule ecology (Schulz 1998) was only pub-
lished about 15 years ago. Whereas organizational ecology (Hannan and Freeman
1977; 1984) is primarily concerned with how competition and legitimation processes
affect rates of organizational birth, growth, and death, rule ecology adapts this
theoretical lens to the context of populations of rules (van Witteloostuijn 2003),
and applies organizational ecology’s empirical toolkit to estimate rule changes, births,
and deaths. Specifically, rule ecologists have used the quantitative methods standard
in organizational ecology to determine how the opposite theoretical processes of
(post-) Weberian rule-breeding and legal learning jointly determine the evolution of
written rule stocks (March et al. 2000; van Witteloostuijn and de Jong 2010).
The first rule ecology study of Schulz (1998) examines the production of both
academic and administrative organizational rules in a large US research university
over time. Overall, these university rule populations grew over time, but at a decreas-
ing rate. In ecological terms, this growth pattern is referred to as a negative density
dependence relationship.
Van Witteloostuijn (2003) introduces an ecology of law approach to move beyond
the organizational rule level, and to take into account rule dynamics at the national
and supranational level. Van Witteloostuijn and de Jong (2008; 2010) empirically test
the ecology of law approach, studying the relationship between rule birth events, mea-
sured as an increase in the number of sentences involved in the creation of new rules,
and rule density in the Dutch higher education domain for the 1960–2004 period. The
joint effect of the aforementioned (post-) Weberian rule breeding and legal learning
processes results in a reverse U-shaped pattern, which means that at low-density levels
(small rule stocks) there are many rule births, whereas at high-density levels (large rule
stocks) rule births still occur, but at a decreasing rate.
Kaufmann and van Witteloostuijn (2011) also find support for a reverse U-shaped
pattern between European competition rule births and rule density. Surprisingly, the
density dependence pattern for rule death, which is hypothesized to be the mirror
image of the rule birth pattern, displays the same reverse U-shaped pattern in this
setting. The authors argue that this unexpected finding can be attributed to the
infrequency of rule death events. Finally, Kaufmann and van Witteloostuijn (2012)
explicitly conceptualize supranational and national rules as organizational red tape
drivers, and determine the size of the European and Dutch competition rule stocks,
as well as the part of the Dutch competition rule stock that explicitly refers to
European rules and regulations (which is labeled the Europeanized Dutch rule stock).
Their findings show that all rule stocks have drastically increased in size over time,
and that much of this increase can be attributed to European legislation.
Although the previously mentioned ecological studies have contributed to our
understanding of rule ecology, the focus in existing work has been on within-
population, or horizontal, rule dynamics. As a result, the effect of interactions across
different levels of analysis (supranational, national, and organizational) remains
unclear. This is where organizational ecology’s so-called cascade effect comes in.
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The concept of change cascades was introduced into organizational ecology by
Hannan, Po´los, and Carroll (2003a; 2003b) to further develop structural inertia
theory by specifying the subtle mechanisms that drive the higher likelihood of
mortality after the implementation of (core) organizational changes. They argue that
an organizational change initiative is likely to generate a series of unintended and
unexpected change events throughout the organization further down the line: ‘‘We
concentrate on the possibility that actions in one unit can set off cascades of actions
in other units’’ (Hannan et al. 2003a, 464). In the following, by analogy, we apply a
similar cascade logic in the context of rule ecology.
Rule-Making Cascade Effects
In organizational ecology theory, cascade effects reflect the argument that changes
in one part of the organization may also affect other, interdependent parts of the same
organization (Hannan et al. 2003a; 2003b). Due to the difficulties of predicting
beforehand which interconnected organizational features will be affected by a given
change—let alone the final outcomes of such a change—cascade effects entail the risk
of an overdose of change to the organization (Levinthal and Posen 2007), which parti-
cularly affects the likelihood of organizational failure (Wezel and van Witteloostuijn
2006).
Ecological cascade effects have been studied in a number of empirical settings.
Wezel and van Witteloostuijn (2006), for example, study organizational change
through product portfolio expansion in the context of the British motorcycle indus-
try for the period from 1895 to 1993. The authors argue that ‘‘[t]he likelihood that a
change cascade increases the chance of failure depends on the capacity of the firm to
‘digest’ the expansion, whether minor or significant’’ (Wezel and van Witteloostuijn
2006, 13). One of the main findings of the study is that specific characteristics of
firms can moderate the adverse effects of organizational change.
Taking organizational ecology theory as a steppingstone, we argue that cascade
dynamics are also at play in rule-making settings. From an ecological perspective,
rule-making cascades, whereby the introduction of rules in one area results in the
introduction of, or changes to, rules in other areas, occur at every policy level. At
the organizational level, March et al. (2000, 2) note that ‘‘[t]he density of written rules
affects both their mutual autonomy and the possibility of new rules. Changes in one
rule can impinge on other rules, creating ripples of rule creation and revision through
a system of written rules.’’ Rule-making cascade effects are pronounced in the area
of rule birth and change (van Witteloostuijn and de Jong 2010; Kaufmann and van
Witteloostuijn 2012), but do not seem to be so in the domain of rule death, as the
latter tends to be a rare event (Kaufmann and vanWitteloostuijn 2011). Indeed, many
national regulatory reform programs fail substantially, if at all, to reduce rule stocks
(de Jong and van Witteloostuijn 2015).
Existing rule ecology studies have mostly looked at the effect of rule density on rule
birth events within a single rule population, which may entail horizontal rule-making
cascade effects. Here, we focus on rule-making cascades in multi-level settings, which
we refer to as a vertical process. A possible explanation for rule makers adding to
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existing rule stocks can be found in the literature on policy taxonomy (e.g., Lowi
1972). For example, research has found that regulatory agencies introduce additional
rules to fill in broad, and possibly ambiguous, mandates (Meier 1980). In this light,
Coglianese (2004, 358) notes that US regulators ‘‘have adopted about ten times more
rules than Congress has passed laws, even though both have the same binding legal
effect on regulated entities.’’ Similarly, Chun and Rainey (2005a; 2005b) find for a
sample of US federal agencies that the ‘‘rules to law’’ ratio is higher for regulatory
agencies compared to their non-regulatory counterparts.
Helm (2006, 173) offers a more cynical argument for rule-breeding behavior
and posits that ‘‘[r]egulatory bodies have a direct incentive to oversupply regulation.
Institutions have budgets and missions; their staff have salaries and careers. The
former are related to the latter: in general, the bigger the budget, the greater the
pay, non-pecuniary benefits, and scope for promotion.’’ Zeckhauser (1979) points
out that using regulation as a distributional tool may result in additional regulation
being required. This process is referred to as pyramiding intervention. Specifically,
Zeckhauser argues that redistributive regulation often relates to price control, which
interferes with the key functions of prices as incentivizing correct behavior and signal-
ing real resource costs. As a result, ‘‘we must now regulate because people will neither
know what to do nor have appropriate incentives to do so’’ (Zeckhauser 1979, 18). In
the case of rent control, pyramiding intervention implies that building codes need to
be imposed to prevent landlords from letting housing quality deteriorate to compen-
sate for lower rental income. Due to these interventions, buildings will be worth
considerably less, which means that housing construction must now be subsidized,
etc. In any case, functional implementation of mandates, undesirable bureaucratic
behavior, and unintended outcomes of regulation are all expected to result in rule
stock increases.
In the red tape literature, multi-level rule dynamics are reflected in the so-called
external control model of red tape, which reflects red tape that ‘‘originates externally
but has internal organizational impacts’’ (Bozeman 1993, 291). In this model, exter-
nality is linked to social distance, such as differences in organizational culture or
norms. Brewer et al. (2012) put forward three arguments as to why external control
increases red tape. First, misapplication of rules is more likely if the number and diver-
sity of stakeholders developing rules increase. Organizations will experience difficult-
ies in exerting precise control over rule implementation if a multitude of stakeholder
interests is involved. Such a lack of control may, in turn, create red tape. Second, more
distant or highly specialized rule makers will find it harder to communicate with
the organization, referred to as ‘‘communication entropy.’’ Third, rule ownership
decreases if the rule maker is more distant. As a result, externally imposed rules
‘‘are much more likely to be misunderstood, resented, and ultimately undermined’’
(Brewer et al. 2012, 291) when compared to internally adopted rules.
Based on this, each rule falls somewhere on a spectrum of external-internal control,
ranging from entirely internally adopted rules with no external involvement whatso-
ever to rules imposed by a distant supranational organization with no organizational
involvement at all. The literature argues that the higher the level of external control
associated with a given rule, the more likely it becomes that this rule will cause red
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tape at the organizational level. Clearly, the level of external control increases with
each level of policymaking. This logic implies, for example, that supranational rules
are more likely to cause red tape than national rules.
Our conceptualization of vertical rule-making cascades can be illustrated by
looking at the transposition of European Union directives into national legislation.
In a nutshell, directives are only binding with regard to results, and leave member
states considerable leeway in terms of forms and methods as to how these results
are achieved (Mastenbroek 2003). This, in turn, implies that member states need to
either change existing national rules or introduce new rules in order to meet the out-
come requirements the directives stipulate. The potential for rule-making cascades as
a result of interactions between European and national rules is also mentioned by
Kaufmann and van Witteloostuijn (2012) in their study of European and Dutch
competition rule stock sizes.
The transposition of directives into national law is often linked to the concept of
gold plating, which can be defined as national legislators ‘‘adding to, or enhancing,
the conditions that are specified in EU legislation’’ (McDonald 2000, 211). According
to the European Commission (2006), member states often implement directives in
ways that entail additional costs and burdens, as reflected in the argument that
‘‘surveys consistently show that, in the minds of citizens and businessmen, ‘red tape’
is associated with areas of regulation that are not primarily dealt with at European
level’’ (European Commission 2006, 6). The term gold plating is specifically linked
to research on European rules, but similar rule-breeding dynamics are likely to apply
to other multi-level rule-making settings. As a result, the concept seems particularly
relevant for red tape researchers as the introduction of ‘‘unnecessary’’ rules and
regulations may well be an important red tape driver.
Integrating these arguments from the rule ecology, European policy, and red tape
literatures implies that rule-making cascades are more likely to occur in a multi-level
context, which, in turn, will drive organizational red tape. We will empirically explore
this claim for the European gas transport domain in the next two sections, focusing on
Gasunie as our case organization.
EUROPEAN AND DUTCH GAS TRANSPORT RULE STOCKS
A Longitudinal Analysis
In this section, we look at the evolution of rule stock sizes at the European
and Dutch level in the gas transport policy domain. This policy domain offers a
suitable setting for our ecological rule-making cascade approach, since the domain
has undergone substantial policy changes at the European level (Eikeland 2011;
Nechva´tal et al. 2012), which has also shaped the current Dutch Gas Act. This
vertical dynamic of the transposition of European rules into a national Gas Act
offers tentative support for a rule-making cascade process. Furthermore, the Dutch
gas transport market is heavily regulated through a variety of secondary laws, most
notably the so-called Gas Codes, which add another layer of rule making to the
regulatory framework.
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The arguments in favor of studying the European and Dutch rule dynamics in the
gas transport domain notwithstanding, we are aware of the fact that our empirical set-
ting is rather unique. Indeed, we do not argue that the current study is representative
of policy dynamics and rule-making cascades in general, as each policy domain (and
the organizations operating in that domain) has its own idiosyncrasies and path-
dependent evolution. Instead, we introduce our empirical setting as one potential
scenario of rule-making cascades, and note that our findings should be compared
to other contexts in future research. Basically, as noted in the introduction, our case
of gas-related rule dynamics is meant to illustrate the new logic introduced here.
The objective rule counts from this section are used as inputs for our analysis of
formalization and red tape at the organizational level at our case study organization
in the next section: Gasunie in the Netherlands. But first, we provide a detailed
description of our rule-counting procedure (see also van Witteloostuijn and de Jong
2007; 2008; 2010; Kaufmann and van Witteloostuijn 2012).
Determining European and Dutch Rule Stock Sizes
In order to assess the size and evolution of the European and Dutch gas transport
policy rule stock, we require an accurate count of all relevant legal rules. Specifically,
we are interested in both European regulations (that are directly binding in their
entirety) and directives (that are only binding with regard to the specified results).
We start by collecting information on all gas-transport-related EU regulations from
the online EUR-Lex database’s advanced search module, which contains all legal
acts that have been published in the Official Journal of the European Union.1
In the end, we are left with 36 unique EU gas regulations that deal with gas trans-
port topics, such as Regulations 1775=2005 and 715=2009 on ‘‘conditions for access to
the natural gas transmission networks.’’ The subject matter of these regulations
is market competition in the gas transport domain, which is the focal point of our
analysis. Indeed, as we will discuss in the next section, formalization and red tape
in our case study organization are strongly affected by this particular rule stock.
For each of the 36 sample regulations, we downloaded the English text in rtf format,
placed each regulation in a separate Microsoft Word document, and determined the
exact number of lines in the main part of the legal text of each regulation using the
word-count option (preambles and appendices are excluded from our analysis). All
regulations have the same font type (Tahoma) and size (10).
Information on amendments to regulations, which is also provided in the EUR-
Lex database, is retrieved to track any subsequent changes to existing regulations,
as well as regulation repeals. In order to arrive at rule stock size estimates, we
distinguish between three categories of rule dynamics: birth (the introduction of a
new rule with no pre-existing link to other regulations); change (amendments to
existing regulations; these can result in rule stock increases or decreases, or can have
a neutral effect); and death (the repeal of existing rules) (van Witteloostuijn and de
Jong 2007; 2010; Kaufmann and van Witteloostuijn 2011; 2012).
In the current study, we are solely interested in the combined effects of rule birth,
change, and death events on the total gas transport rule stock. The net change for the
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EU rule stock is calculated as the net balance of new rule birth events plus the rule
stock increase changes, minus the number of rule deaths and rule stock decrease
changes, which is measured in the number of lines of each rule dynamics event. This
net balance is then added to the rule stock of the previous time period.
The EUR-Lex database is also used to retrieve the texts of relevant EU directives.
During our sample period, only nine gas-transport-related directives have been
introduced. However, this rather low number of policy documents does not imply
that EU gas directives have been of little importance at the national level. In fact,
the current Dutch Gas Act (Gaswet in Dutch), which is the foundation of all Dutch
gas market regulation, was introduced in 2000 as a means to transpose a specific
European directive on common rules for the internal market in natural gas (Directive
98=30=EC). We return to this issue in our discussion of the European and Dutch gas
transport rule stocks.
For the Dutch part of our rule stock sample, we use the same approach as outlined
earlier. However, the relevant Dutch laws, and their amendments, are identified
using the Dutch database Kluwer Plaza. Furthermore, not all relevant legal texts
are available online (from the official website www.wetten.nl); a small number of
legal texts were introduced before 1997 and had to be consulted in hard copies of
the official journals Staatsblad and Staatscourant. Finally, in line with Kaufmann
and van Witteloostuijn (2012), we make a distinction between Dutch formal laws
and ‘‘secondary laws’’ (such as royal decrees). Furthermore, we provide count data
on so-called Gas Codes, which are policy documents created by the Dutch energy
regulator (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit, or NMa).
A limitation of our rule-counting approach is that our data do not tell us if certain
rules are subordinate to others. In fact, the quantitative approach taken here does
not allow us to make any inferences about the content of rule stocks. This is a recur-
ring issue in all rule-count studies. In general, it is assumed that impacts of different
rules are normally distributed if the sample size is sufficiently large, which mitigates
some of these representativeness concerns (Alesina et al. 2005). Furthermore,
Kaufmann and van Witteloostuijn (2012) argue that quantitative rule counts should
be supplemented with qualitative data for triangulation, which is the approach taken
in this study.
The Evolution of European and Dutch Gas Transport Rule Stocks
The first European regulation related to the gas market entered into force in 1972,
as shown in Figure 1.2
Up to and including 1981, an additional 15 regulations of limited size were
introduced, further increasing the European gas policy rule stock to a total size of
roughly 400 lines. The rule stock remained at this level until the mid-1990s, only
to decrease in the following years. This finding is indicative of the minor role of
energy policy in the EU after the 1950s (Padgett 1992). According to Nechva´tal
et al. (2012, 2), the ‘‘importance of energy policy was neglected throughout the devel-
opment of the EU and it has come forth again in the nineties and at the beginning of
the 21st century.’’
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The first comprehensive attempt at creating an internal energy market resulted in
the introduction of two directives related to electricity (1996) and gas (1998), which
jointly made up the first internal energy policy package (Eberlein 2008; Eikeland
2011; Nechva´tal et al. 2012). In terms of requirements, this package was not very
invasive, however, as only ‘‘a very few high-volume consumers were granted the right
to shift supplier’’ (Eikeland 2011, 249), and national energy suppliers were still able
to discriminate against potential users of their gas transmission networks.
The entry into force of the 1998 gas directive is not reflected in Figure 1, since our
measure of European gas transport rules consists solely of legal rules contained in
directly binding regulations. Recall, from our earlier discussion, that directives need
to be transposed into national legislation and are therefore an intermediate policy
document. As a result, the discussion of European gas directives is limited to their
effect on national legislation that structures the Dutch gas market.
As a result of lagging member-state implementation of the directives from the first
energy package (Eikeland 2011), the European Commission decided to initiate a
second energy package. This second package entered into force in 2003, and repre-
sented a big step towards opening up and integrating national markets (Eberlein
2008). Specifically, the second package inter alia included the right to switch suppliers
for all consumers. Furthermore, under the second package, the network activities of
national energy companies were separated from production and supply activities,
through a process called legal unbundling (Eikeland 2011). We return to the issue
of unbundling in our discussion of our case study organization. Again, the introduc-
tion of directives has no size effect on the European rule stock, as shown in Figure 1. In
fact, between 1996 and 2005, the rule stock almost reached the 1972 level again, at just
under 150 lines. This noted rule stock size decrease is caused by the repeal of a number
of outdated regulations in 1996. Only with the entry into force of the aforementioned
Regulation 1775=2005 on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission
networks did the rule stock increase again to about 450 lines in 2006.
Despite the introduction of a number of gas market regulations and directives in
the first and second packages, vertically integrated incumbents were still perceived
Figure 1. The evolution of the EU gas transport rule stock.
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as a barrier to competition in the internal energy market by the European Com-
mission, which resulted in the introduction of a third energy package in 2009 and a
sharp increase in rule stock size (Pollitt 2008; Eikeland 2011). The introduction of
yet another policy package is indicative of a horizontal rule-making cascade effect;
what started out as two directives on electricity and gas liberalization in the 1990s
evolved into a third energy package that quadrupled the EU gas rule stock to almost
2,000 lines, a size boosted further by the entry into force of the Security of Supply
Regulation in 2010. This drastic increase in rule stock size mirrors the argument by
van Witteloostuijn and de Jong (2010, 194) that ‘‘[by] introducing a rule, demand
for additional rules is boosted as the audience is triggered to ask for more, being made
aware of the potential to regulate.’’
In addition to the horizontal cascade effects at the EU level, there is also evidence of
rule-making cascades at the Dutch level. Essentially, the Dutch gas transport market
was unregulated until the year 2000, at which time the Dutch Gas Act (Gaswet)
entered into force. The Gas Act is an implementation of Directive 98=30=EC, which
is part of the first energy package. This is an example of a vertical cascade effect
resulting from functional implementation, whereby rules at one level (the EU) require
additional rule making at another level (the member state). Size-wise, the entry into
force of the Gas Act immediately raised the Dutch rule stock to 1,500 lines, as shown
in Figure 2.
In 2004, the Gas Act was amended as a response to another EU directive (Directive
2003=55=EC), which was reflected in a rule-making cascade of additional Gas Act
articles and a corresponding rule stock size increase. With regard to Dutch secondary
laws, the story is somewhat different. Here, we find a steady rule stock increase from
2001 onward, with a peak of almost 1,900 lines in 2008. In 2009 and 2010, the Dutch
secondary rule stock appears to level out at roughly 1,800 lines. As secondary laws are
used to implement Dutch formal laws, the impact of European rules is only indirect
for this type of rule stock (Kaufmann and van Witteloostuijn 2012).
Figure 2. The evolution of the Dutch gas transport rule stocks.
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Regulation of the Dutch gas transport market is not limited to Dutch formal and
secondary laws, however. In fact, the most detailed type of government regulation in
the Dutch gas transport domain is the so-called Gas Codes, as shown in Figure 3.
Gas Codes are designed to implement the Dutch Gas Act, and describe the relation-
ship amongst national network administrators, as well as their relationship with other
connected members. Unlike formal and secondary laws that are introduced by the
Dutch parliament, Gas Codes are created and enforced by the Dutch competition
authority, which acts in its capacity as regulator. There are three types of Gas Codes:
technical, tariff, and information codes. The level of detail contained in these codes is
reflected in its corresponding rule stock size, as shown in Figure 3. Indeed, when
compared to Figures 1 and 2, the Gas Codes rule stock size is larger than the
combined size of the European, Dutch formal or secondary rule stocks for most of
our sample period. Compared to Dutch formal and secondary laws, Gas Codes leave
the Dutch regulator a larger degree of freedom to deal with the idiosyncrasies of
the Dutch gas transport market. To what extent Gas Codes are dealing with genuine
idiosyncrasies or act as a source of gold plating is an empirical matter. We return to
this issue in the next section, where we discuss the organizational rule stock at our case
study organization.
The Evolution of Organizational Formalization at Gasunie
We now turn our attention to the final stage of rule-making cascades, which is the
underlying mechanisms through which external rules cause organizational formaliza-
tion and red tape. First, we provide a detailed count overview of the organizational
rule stock to determine quantitative rule stock evolution, which is in line with our
approach for the European and Dutch rule stocks. Next, we use information from
a set of interviews to link our objective rule count data to perceptions of rule-making
cascades, organizational formalization, and red tape. Jointly, these data sources allow
us to identify the rule-making mechanisms that ultimately result in organizational red
tape. But, to start with, we briefly introduce our case organization.
Figure 3. The evolution of the Dutch Gas Code rule stock.
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Description of the Case Study Organization
Gasunie, founded in 1963, is a Dutch organization responsible for the transport of
natural gas. The annual amount of transported gas through Gasunie’s network is
equal to roughly 25% of total European gas consumption, making Gasunie an
important player in the European gas market. Until 2005, Gasunie had been respon-
sible for both the transportation and selling of natural gas. However, the EU’s
second energy package required that these types of activities be unbundled into
separate organizational entities. Consequently, Gasunie’s shareholders (Shell,
ExxonMobil, and the Dutch state) opted for creating an independent transmission
system operator (ITSO), which means that transmission assets for the transport of
natural gas operate entirely independently from the rest of the system (Pollitt
2008). The liberalization of the gas transport market also resulted in the creation
of a new organizational entity, called Gas Transport Services. This entity is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Gasunie, but is required by law to operate independently. As a
result of these institutional changes, there are now a large number of firewalls and
compliance procedures within the organization to deal with; for example, non-
discriminatory treatment of customers.
The sheer degree of regulatory intensity at the European and Dutch levels, as
well as the profound institutional changes derived from this external regulation,
make Gasunie an ideal candidate for analyzing the cascade effects of external rules
on organizational rules and red tape. Nonetheless, it is important to note that we
are dealing with one—very specific—Dutch organization. The fact that Gasunie is
both owned and controlled by the Dutch government implies, for example, that
there may be unique interactions between political and managerial control
objectives. Indeed, it seems likely that the institutional environment within which
Gasunie operates will have an effect on the type of (top) managers working for
the organization, even if the government is not allowed directly to appoint top
managers.
In conclusion, we should be cautious when trying to generalize our findings to
other organizations, as rule dynamics are expected to differ not only in distinct pol-
icy domains, but also across organizations. Consequently, the following discussion is
but one example of rule-making cascades at the organizational level within a specific
policy domain. However, we believe that our case organization nicely illustrates our
central concept of rule-breeding cascade effects and fits with the exploratory aim of
this study. We return to this issue in the conclusion.
Determining Organizational Rule Stock Size
The organizational formalization data collection procedure has been described in
detail in Kaufmann and Feeney (2012). The final sample covers an 11-year period
(from 2000 until 2010) and consists of 13,244 documents that were retrieved from
the organization’s electronic archive DIS. These documents are part of departmental
manuals, with three types of documents that are most common: specifications, work
instructions, and procedures. Specifications are always of a technical nature, whereas
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work instructions and procedures can either be technical (i.e., technical engineering)
or more administrative (i.e., financial resource management).
Given the sheer size of Gasunie’s document stock, we need a few shortcuts to
make our count exercise doable. Document size in lines is obtained by multiplying
the number of document pages by 30, which is the average number of document
lines, obtained from a random sample of 20 documents. Appendix documents, which
comprise less than 10% of the total organizational rule stock, are assigned a constant
value of 150 lines, based on a random sample of 10 appendices. All rule count data
are aggregated into annual observations, the results of which are discussed next.
The Evolution of the Organizational Rule Stock
The evolution of internal rules during the sample period of 2000–2010 is shown in
Figure 4.
Two important observations can be made concerning the evolution of organiza-
tional formalization from Figure 4. First, the total internal rule stock at Gasunie
consisted of almost one million lines (997,470, to be exact) at the end of 2010.
Second, the evolution of organizational formalization shows a clear upward trend:
between the years 2000 and 2010, the organizational rule stock increased roughly
by a factor of five. A straightforward explanation for the strong increase in organiza-
tional rules at Gasunie, aside from rule-making cascades, is an increase in organiza-
tional size. The number of employees at Gasunie has increased from 1,425 in 2005 to
1,746 in 2010 (plus 22.5%). Given this relatively mild organizational growth rate, it
seems unlikely that the growth in the organizational rule stock, which almost
doubled during the same time period, is attributable solely to organizational
growth.3 Indeed, the evolutionary pattern of increasing organizational formalization
is in line with our findings for the European and Dutch rule stocks, as shown in
Figure 5, where absolute rule stock values have been divided by their average value
for comparability purposes.
Figure 4. The evolution of organizational formalization at Gasunie, 2000–2010.
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The rule stock growth patterns at different levels of analysis appear correlated, but
it is important to note that vertical rule-making cascades are lagged. Indeed, many
EU scholars have found that the transposition of directives into national legislation
is often delayed (Mastenbroek 2003; Steunenberg 2006). Similarly, it takes time
for organizations to implement European and national rules in their internal rule
stocks. As a result, our count data do not tell us everything about the extent and
underlying processes of the dynamics between these various rule stocks. The next
step, therefore, is to use subjective data from a set of interviews with Gasunie
employees to verify the existence of rule-making cascade effects in the gas transport
policy domain.
RULE-MAKING CASCADES: EVIDENCE FROM INTERVIEW DATA
Data Collection
We started our qualitative analysis by conducting interview sessions in two stages.
The first stage consisted of focus group interviews in which the relevant topics and
research questions were discussed. Most notably, these focus group interviews were
used to determine the organizational units most heavily affected by external rules
Figure 5. The evolution of European, Dutch, and organizational formalization (normalized).
665DO RULES BREED RULES?
derived from the gas transport market liberalization, which are Legal Affairs and Gas
Transport Services (GTS). The Legal Affairs department is directly involved in imple-
menting existing legislation, but also plays a role in the development of new legis-
lation through consultations with the relevant legislators in Gasunie’s role as
Transmission System Operator. The GTS department was actually specifically
created in 2004 to implement the unbundling of gas transport and gas sales activities,
as required by European and Dutch legislation.
In the second stage, we conducted interviews with 11 employees from these two
heavily regulated departments (which resulted in 17 interview hours, in total). The
interviewed employees represented a mix of advisors (2), senior advisors (6), and man-
agers (3) who deal with requirements related to European and=or Dutch gas transport
rules in their day-to-day activities. The interview process was designed to provide
qualitative data with regard to European and national formalization as drivers
of organizational formalization and red tape. This purpose was not revealed to the
interviewees, though, so as not to bias their responses. Rather, interviewees were told
that the purpose of the study was to analyze the evolution of organizational rule
stocks within Gasunie.
Interviews were held at Gasunie headquarters, where employees were informed
about the general purpose of the study and the confidentiality of the results. Once
the employees agreed to the conditions of the interview, they were asked semi-
structured, open-ended questions about their role and activities in the organization,
perceptions about organizational formalization and red tape, and impressions of
European and national formalization on the organization’s functioning. The inter-
viewed employees were not informed about the outcomes of our count analyses,
so as not to influence their perceptions in any way. After the interview sessions, inter-
viewees were provided with a literal transcription for their approval.
The interview transcriptions were coded in the following way. First, all comments
made by interviewees regarding formalization, European, national and organizational
rule stock sizes, cascade effects, and red tape were identified and marked. This process
resulted in a total of 191 comments. Next, both authors independently categorized
the content of each comment in terms of subject matter. Any discrepancies between
the two ratings were discussed and amended where needed. This classification of
comments was then used to identify more general themes from our interview data
related to rule-making cascades. In the end, we are left with four such themes: rule
stock increases, bureaucratic behavior, public values, and red tape.
Rule Stock Increases and Rule-Making Cascades
The interviewed employees all share the notion that the size of European, national,
and organizational rule stocks has increased drastically over time. As noted by one
advisor, when it comes to rule making, ‘‘the only way is up.’’ At the top of the chain,
each new round of legislation at the European level entails additional rules and
requirements both at the national and organizational level. As a result, these European
rules have a very large impact on the organization. For example, a manager noted
that ‘‘there is an increase of European legislation, consisting of very specific and
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identifiable topics that need to be implemented in a certain way. All these rules affect
the way you run your business. You can imagine how invasive this process is, as these
rules determine how you allocate capacity, what your pricing structure looks like, etc.’’
In another example, a manager pointed out national rule-making cascades in the
context of implementing European rules: ‘‘We are not just talking about primary
legislation, but also about secondary legislation and the development of [Gas] codes.
The lower down you get, the more details you encounter. At some point, one can
really question to what extent lower-level legislation is still a direct implementation
of European rules.’’ Similarly, a senior advisor argued that national rule makers take
an unnecessarily stringent approach when implementing European rules, thus result-
ing in even larger national rule stocks. These examples are indicative of gold plating
behavior by the national rule makers when implementing European rules.
Two managers noted that internal process and governance rules have increased as
a direct result of European and national rules. In this light, a senior advisor pointed
out that internal rules have become more elaborate: ‘‘especially in those cases where
multiple external parties are involved[ . . . ], it is important to have a very precise
picture of all the internal procedural steps when making a decision. Has the Board
of Directors reviewed the case in a specific way? Have the Supervisory Board and
shareholder looked at it?’’
Although all interviewed employees indicated that external rules are the main
driver of internal rule stock increases, the organization itself was, at times, also men-
tioned as a driver of internal rule creation. Both a manager and senior advisor pointed
out that, in the absence of European and national rule makers, part of the internal
rule stock would have been created by the organization itself so as to offer clients a
greater degree of standardization. Another manager described a sentiment within
the organization that ‘‘if there are no internal rules that provide certainty [for a spe-
cific task], one would rather not perform the task.’’ In this example, internal demands
are driving an increase in organizational rules, rather than external actors.
Overall, then, the interview sessions confirm our quantitative findings that increases
in European, Dutch, and organizational rule stocks are responsible for rule-making
cascades. From our interview data, we also identified two different arguments as to
why rule-making cascades occur; namely, bureaucratic behavior and public values.
Bureaucratic Behavior
In total, six interviewed employees posited that rule-making cascades are driven,
in part, by bureaucratic rule-breeding behavior. One manager argued that European
policymakers can earn their stripes by introducing new legislation: ‘‘In some cases
policymakers owe their career in the European Commission to having successfully
passed new legislation.’’ As a result, this manager argued that ‘‘there is an inherent
mechanism at work that will result in a fourth and even a fifth energy package in the
future.’’ Another manager felt that ‘‘it takes more courage not to make a rule than to
make it.’’
More generally, three employees reasoned that additional rules and regulations
create employment opportunities at the organizational, national, and European level.
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A senior advisor speculated that there is no end in sight for rule stock increases, as too
many stakeholders benefit from introducing and implementing rules. Similarly, a
manager referred to the liberalization of the European gas transport market as one
large employment project, while another manager indicated that it is becoming
increasingly difficult to dampen rule production as more and more people are making
a living by breeding rules.
Interestingly, comments about bureaucratic behavior were all associated with
European and national rule makers, as opposed to organizational rule makers. This
finding supports Helm’s (2006) argument that regulatory agencies have an incentive
to oversupply regulation, as both the institutional budget and staff members’ careers
are, at least to some extent, conditional on policy output. In this view, rule makers
must breed rules as their raison d’etre. Furthermore, these negative employee views
on bureaucratic behavior provide tentative support for Bozeman’s (1993; 2000)
external control model of red tape, which assumes that external rules are more
likely to result in organizational red tape than internal rules. We return to this issue
later on.
Public Values and Rule-Making Cascades
In addition to bureaucratic behavior, the interview sessions also indicated that
some rule-making cascades are created to safeguard public values; i.e., rules that
advance control, accountability, or public security and safety (Bozeman and Feeney
2011). As the relative importance of public values is likely to differ between stake-
holders, the perceived validity and effectiveness of rules linked to safeguarding
specific public values will also be stakeholder specific. This line of reasoning mirrors
the argument by Kaufman (1977, 4) that ‘‘one person’s red tape may be another’s
treasured safeguard.’’
With regard to increases in European and national rules, employees noted that
liberalizing the European gas market is a worthwhile objective, in principle.
However, five employees explicitly questioned the effectiveness of the methods used
to achieve this objective. According to one advisor, continuous change in the com-
plex gas market quickly makes European laws, which can take up to five years to
be enacted, obsolete. A manager noted that ‘‘regulation was introduced for a specific
goal; liberalization. However, over time policymakers have attempted to use regu-
lation to also achieve other objectives. This, in turn, has led to all sorts of side effects
that are not clear [to policymakers].’’ Similarly, a senior advisor emphasized that
policymakers do not reflect sufficiently on how the market is currently functioning,
and if existing rules could be abolished. In general, the interviewed employees
were critical of how European and national rules are used to achieve market
liberalization.
At the organizational level, rule-making cascades were, in part, attributed to
another public value: concerns about the safety and reliability of gas transport that
go beyond externally imposed legal requirements. In this regard, an advisor noted
that Gasunie probably has more stringent requirements than its competitors when
it comes to safety. The most illustrative example of rules driven by public values
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at Gasunie is the safety of gas pipelines. A senior advisor noted that employees are
intrinsically motivated to create rules that help ensure the safety of gas pipelines, as
‘‘the worst case scenario of a pipeline blowing up [ . . . ] would have serious
consequences for [Gasunie’s] reputation.’’
Another senior advisor noted that the organization is increasingly paying
attention to safety concerns in response to national disasters such as the Volendam
cafe´ fire, which resulted in the death of 14 young people, and the explosion of a fire-
works factory in a residential area in Enschede, which killed 23. These organizational
safety concerns were perceived as valid reasons for rule-making cascades, which
again supports the argument that externally imposed rules are more likely to result
in red tape (Bozeman 2000). We discuss the relationship between rules and red tape
in more detail in the next sub-section.
Rules and Red Tape
One of the main limitations of the red tape literature is the fact that no definitive
measurement of red tape exists (Bozeman 2012; Bozeman and Feeney 2011). Red
tape researchers have mostly used the general red tape item put forward by Rainey
et al. (1995) to ask survey respondents about the level of red tape in their organiza-
tion. This red tape measure is hotly debated, however (Feeney 2012; Kaufmann and
Feeney 2012). Since we do not know the requirements and burdens associated with
the rule stocks from our count data, we need to be cautious in interpreting rule stock
increases as equivalent to higher levels of red tape. Still, the interview sessions
provide information that is indicative of red tape caused by European, national,
and organizational rule stocks.
In total, seven interviewees explicitly associate increasing rule stocks with
additional paperwork and=or administrative delay at the organizational level, which
are both key features of red tape in the literature (Bozeman and Feeney 2011;
Kaufmann and Feeney 2014). For example, a senior advisor noted that, in recent
years, gathering and submitting information to the national energy regulator may
take multiple employees two or three weeks per request. Similarly, both a senior
advisor and manager found that new legislation aimed at speeding up the process
of Gasunie getting approval for large investments through a centralized procedure
has actually had the opposite effect. Whereas under the old system different proce-
dures related to planning and the environment could be initiated at the same time,
the new legislation requires that these procedures are done sequentially. As a result,
the entire process may take up to a year longer to complete.
Aside from rule burden and administrative delay, employees also identified a
range of other inefficiencies caused by rule surges that hint at the existence of red
tape. An overabundance of rules is associated with organizational inflexibility
regarding product specification and customer demands (six employees), uncertainty
regarding pricing strategies and new investment projects (four), and impediments to
the creation of a free market (three). In this light, one manager argued that it is hard
for Gasunie managers to take calculated risks, as ever-changing regulation causes
uncertainty concerning both products and prices. In general, employees perceive
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external rules as a powerful red tape driver, which provides support for Bozeman’s
(1993; 2000) external control model of red tape.
Finally, perceptions of ineffective rules by Gasunie employees are often linked to
perceptions of ineffective rule-makers. Indeed, employees expressed concerns about
the level of competence of the national regulatory and control agencies on multiple
occasions. For example, a senior advisor notes that ‘‘information requests often do
not coincide with the way in which data is stored and retrieved here. When we develop
a new information system, for example, we are often curious about the outcomes and
already start comparing various measures. Then, we get an information request [from
the regulator], asking us to compare two somewhat different measures. We had
already been keeping track of the original measures for over a year, but in a slightly
different way.’’ The senior advisor goes on to note that the original data are unaccept-
able to the regulator.
In addition, it is not always clear what the regulator intends to do with the
requested data in the first place. In this light, another senior advisor provided the fol-
lowing anecdote: ‘‘For the last six years we have had to provide a so-called Quality
and Capacity Plan [to the regulator] every two years. The Plan needs to show that
our systems are of a certain quality, and that our system capacity is also sufficient.
At the moment, we are in the process of updating this 50–60 page document, and
we received feedback [from the regulator] that this document also needs to include
the corporate resources registry. Apparently, the person requesting this addition does
not fully realize that if we were to print out this registry here, it would take 20 trucks
to transport it to their offices in The Hague.’’
In conclusion, we find that many of the interviewed employees associate the
increasingly complex system of internal and external rules facing Gasunie with ineffi-
ciencies and red tape. Hence, the argument that ‘‘more rules will likely mean more red
tape’’ (Bozeman 2000, 131) seems to have merit in the context of our rule count
study. Especially relevant is the finding that European and national rules are assigned
much of the organizational red tape blame. It is important to note, however, that red
tape perceptions of the interviewed employees may be biased, and may differ among
individuals and stakeholders.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we put forward an ecological perspective for understanding rule-
breeding processes at different policy levels. Essentially, we argue that populations
of rules may proliferate via two related processes. First, the implementation of
higher-level regulation may require additional rule making at a lower level, as in
the case of national implementation of European directives. Second, each rule-
making event entails a risk that more new rules are introduced at a lower rule-making
level than necessary to meet the higher-level requirements. Jointly, these processes
may result in what we refer to as vertical rule breeding, or cascade effects. This vertical
perspective should be viewed as an addition to the existing rule ecology literature that
focuses on rule dynamics within specific rule populations, or horizontal rule breeding.
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We explore our ecological approach in the setting of European gas transport pol-
icy. First, we provide a detailed count of the evolution of rule stocks at the European
level, and show how European rules spur the introduction of Dutch rules in the same
policy domain. Second, we study organizational formalization at the large Dutch gas
transport organization Gasunie. Size-wise, the organizational rule stock shows an
unambiguous growth pattern, with a fivefold increase in rule stock size during our
sample period (2000–2010). This growth pattern is comparable to the evolution of
European and Dutch rule stocks in the same domain, providing tentative support
for rule-making cascades.
The findings from the objective count data are further supported by subjective
information obtained from a set of interviews with Gasunie employees. In a nutshell,
the interviewed employees feel that European, national, and organizational rule stocks
have all increased drastically over time. Based on the interview data, we identified two
main drivers of this rule-breeding behavior. On the one hand, employees felt that rule
breeding is an essential tool for European and national policymakers to advance their
careers. On the other hand, a number of interviewees indicated that Gasunie itself is
also partly responsible for breeding rules to safeguard public values, most notably the
safety of gas pipelines. As a result, we find that internal and external pressures jointly
determine rule dynamics at our case study organization, and are valued differently by
employees.
Our interview data also provide tentative findings regarding the relationship
between rules and red tape. First, employees argued that rule stock increases at all
levels of analysis have resulted in more paperwork and greater administrative delays.
This finding is in line with much existing red tape research. Second, the interviewees
identified a range of adverse organizational effects caused by excessive rules and reg-
ulations, such as inflexibility regarding customer demands and uncertainty regarding
new investment projects. These findings, too, are potential indicators of red tape.
Third, we found that perceptions of ineffective rules are often intertwined with
perceptions of ineffective rule makers. That is, rules and associated rule burden
are sometimes labeled by employees as excessive simply because the rule maker is
perceived as ill-informed or incompetent. This additional dimension of red tape
has hitherto not been identified in the literature.
The value added of our rules and red tape analysis notwithstanding, we are well
aware that there may be alternative red tape drivers that we have not explored in
the current study. As one reviewer pointed out, human fallibility responses may lead
employees to blame organizational red tape on European and national rules, thus
resulting in false attribution. Similarly, our research design does not allow us to take
into account the impact of any individual-level demographics or personality traits
that may affect red tape perceptions.
Given its explorative nature and associated limitations, we envision a number of
extensions of our current research. First, we have focused on one very specific policy
domain and a similarly unique case study organization. Given the specificity of our
case study, we are cautious in generalizing our findings to other domains and orga-
nizations. Future research on rule-making cascades should also take into account
other types of organizations and policy domains. Furthermore, a comparative study
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on the effects of the same external rules on different organizations could be very
worthwhile to develop a deeper understanding of why some organizations are more
prone to rule-breeding cascades than others.
Second, more could be done to differentiate the effect of external rule stocks on
different parts of an organization. We have limited our analysis of European and
Dutch rules to rules and regulations related to market competition in the gas trans-
port domain, and only interviewed Gasunie employees from departments that were
most directly influenced by this particular regulatory framework. It stands to reason
that some other organizational departments, such as Technical Construction, are
affected less by competition rules, and more by rules concerning safety, for example.
Although it would be virtually impossible to identify and analyze all external rules
and regulations affecting an organization, we are aware of the fact that our concep-
tualization of external rules is rather narrow, and hence could be improved upon.
Third, another avenue for future research is a more detailed study on gold plating
and its relation to red tape. In the current study, we have (tentatively) identified
gold-plating behavior by both the Dutch parliament and the Dutch competition
authority, as viewed by Gasunie employees. Similarly, we have found that Gasunie
itself creates additional rules to ensure the safety of its pipelines, which can be seen as
a form of organizational gold plating. Such intricate dynamics are beyond the scope
of the current article, but merit further attention.
In the context of our study, we are aware that rule-making cascades may occur
without the creation of red tape. For example, the national legislator may need an
additional set of rules to shape the implementation of European directives at the
national level. Such rule-making cascades can be both necessary and reasonable.
As a result, a refined approach is required to explore the pathological elements of rule
stocks. Such an approach may include having relevant rule stakeholders rate the red
tape contents of specific populations of rules, or certain sub-sets of them. Next, rule
changes can be tracked over time; and the same stakeholders can subsequently be
asked to indicate the level of red tape associated with the changed rules. Such a longi-
tudinal approach would allow researchers to test for causality, which ties in with
recent calls to improve on the conceptualization and measurement of red tape.
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NOTES
1. European legislation is classified according to so-called directory codes. The most
important gas transport policy directory code is 125030, but this is a joint code for both
gas- and oil-related regulations. Furthermore, some regulations that have been classified under
code 125010 (supplies and stocks) and code 1260000 (other sources of energy) also deal with
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gas transport legislation. Consequently, we decided to manually review all oil and gas regula-
tions in order to determine which regulations are relevant for our setting and which are not.
2. Note that the European rule stock deals with market competition in the gas market in
general. As a result, the scope of this rule stock is somewhat broader than the rule stock at the
Dutch level, which is concerned primarily with gas transport liberalization. However, for
clarity’s sake, we refer to both types of rules as gas transport rules.
3. Actually, it might rather be the other way around, with formalization leading to growth
in the number of employees.
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